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Most research into PRP has been driven, in one way or another, by an underlying 
assessment of the motivational effects of such schemes, resulting in schemes being 
deemed to be at best unsuccessful in their objectives and at worst demotivating.  Thus 
leaving a fundamental puzzle of why do organisations continue to utilise such schemes?  
This paper attempts to solve part of the puzzle by utilising concepts used for analysing 
previous pay systems but rarely in conjunction with PRP.  Along with a progressive view 
of the politics of pay four case studies will highlight how differing results for similar 
schemes are largely due to PRP being an element of two fundamental bargains which 
take place to aid the management of uncertainty: An ‘effort bargain’ to establish new 
norms and customs of effort; and a ‘process bargain’ to establish new systems of 
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"Perhaps PRP is being measured against the wrong targets?  Instead of placing 
it at the bottom of schemes that motivate it should be placed at the top of 
schemes that lead to control"(Thompson, Marc.  Radio 4, 1993).  
 
 In light of the above quote the aim of this paper is to lay out an alternative 
framework for examining the use of PRP schemes and improving our understanding of the 
processes involved.  PRP was strongly promoted by those intent on bringing about an 
alternative set of relations in the workplace to that of most of the post-war period.  Yet a 
mixed picture of the practical implications of PRP has emerged leaving researchers with 
the task of investigating whether in fact these schemes met the huge expectations placed 
upon them, not least of which was an improvement in performance brought about by a 
supposedly fairer and more motivational pay system. 
 
 The fact that findings are largely negative against performance, fairness and 
motivation left many questions unanswered by research into PRP, not least of which is the 
theoretical weakness founded upon the failure to address a simple question; ‘why do 
organisations manage PRP the way they do and why do organisations continue to pursue 
the PRP approach despite the operational difficulties commonly highlighted by observers 
(Kessler 1994)? 
 
In several places throughout their research, Kessler and Purcell (1992) mention the 
possibility of control being a major factor involved in the use of PRP.  These themes of 
control are present in the literature but undeveloped.  A reader of Kessler and Purcell 
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(1992) may find it difficult to decipher what ‘control’ means within the article.  There is no 
direct answer, but implicit are ideas of : 
· control as creating order and manageability out of chaos; 
· control as linking pay to organisational goals; 
· control over staff, and the restructuring of the employment contract, which may bring 
gains as well as costs to both sides. 
 
 This paper attempts to fill some of the ‘gaps’ by combining a number of key 
analytical concepts previously deployed in analysing other pay systems but rarely employed 
in conjunction with PRP.  It draws on research which analysed PRP in 16 organisations, 
including their origins, implementation, and link with other goals of the business but 
focuses on four detailed case studies to illustrate the main points. The paper will first 
briefly highlight the path that research into PRP has taken within the UK before moving on 
to suggest an alternative framework for analysing the use of PRP, one that recognises the 
dynamic nature of employee relations and the role that control takes within the workplace.  
It was found that PRP schemes involve a search for control and consent which is 
contingent on the ‘politics of pay’ within and around the organisation.  The politics of pay 
involve many different factors at the micro, meso and macro level which are resolved 
through a process of bargaining, uncertainty and power relations.  How these worked in 
practice concerning PRP will be examined in the four case studies. 
 
The objectives of PRP? 
 It is widely accepted that the origins of PRP during the 1980s/90s reflects pressure 
from three main sources. 
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· A link to the ‘entrepreneurial spirit’ or the ‘enterprise culture’ (Armstrong 1995; 
Brading & Wright 1990), 
· A link with, or to, strategic HRM (Brading & Wright 1990; Smith 1993), and 
· pressures on reward systems from changing product/labour market and changing 
technology and work organisation (Vickerstaff 1992). 
PRP held out the promise of a link with motivation while addressing all these factors 
(ACAS 1990; Brading & Wright 1990; Lawler 1977 & 1988.).  Further the simplistic 
criteria behind PRP meant that few organisations were likely to admit that they could not 
meet them. 
 
 The debate into the efficacy of such schemes tended to concentrate on assessing 
the validity of the motivational claims made on behalf of PRP including the 
pay/performance link which was largely judged through its motivational effects rather than 
by corporate performance.  Linking motivation to PRP has been extensively covered 
elsewhere and needs little reintroduction (Cannell and Wood 1992; Marsden and French 
1998; Marsden and Richardson 1994; Thompson and McHugh 1995; Thompson and 
Buchan 1993; Thompson 1992).  Needless to say very few positive effects were noted and 
all found PRP to be demotivational.  For example, Marsden and Richardsons (1994) 
survey of the Inland Revenue found few positive effects except for the raising of staff 
awareness over objectives.  One of the main conclusions was that, if the scheme did not 
improve employee motivation, it is hard to see how it could improve performance. Despite 
major changes to the scheme a return study found results similar to the original (French 
and Marsden, 1997). 
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 This occurs because of the various problems associated with the pay/performance 
link.  First, notions of equality and equity, rather than strengthening the principles behind 
PRP, were found to be competing ideologies which caused resentment and confusion for 
employees (Kessler and Purcell, 1992; Geary 1993).  Second, even leaving aside its 
simplistic assumptions about motivation and fairness, much of what passes for PRP is not 
based on actual performance ( Casey et al. 1992; IRS, 1991).  Third, there is some 
indication that companies may not really know whether PRP improves individual or 
organisational performance (Cannell and Wood 1992).  Two pieces of research sought to 
directly assess the effectiveness of PRP on performance (Lewis 1997; Thompson 1992): 
neither painted a very positive picture of PRP.  
 
There are therefore many dilemma’s thrown up by research into PRP indicating that 
performance and motivation are complex notions.  Using motivation as the starting point 
for examining the success or failure of PRP, as most studies tend to do, therefore limits 
one as to the analytical depth which can be applied to discover the true nature of such 
schemes. Whereas most motivation models would appear to be establishing minimum 
conditions under which workers can be mobilised to consent to the nature of work which 
is demanded of them (Thompson and McHugh 1995) PRP is linked to much wider 
organisational issues. 
 
Objectives for change: Control, consent and contingency. 
 Despite the negativity of the above other potential uses for PRP schemes may 
provide a starting point for examining their true nature.  All concern control and/or 
management strategic choices for bringing about broader organisational change: 
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1. they signal a change in organisational culture (Fowler 1988; Kessler and Purcell 
1992; Lewis 1991; Procter et al 1993; Pendleton 1992.); 
2. they can be used to bring about a restructuring of the employment relationship 
(Fowler 1988; Kessler and Purcell 1992; Procter et al 1993); 
3. they allow companies to reward selectively without an increase in the paybill 
(Goodhart 1993.); 
4. they decentralise collective bargaining (Walsh 1992); 
5. they can marginalise the role of the trade unions (Fowler 1988; Kessler and Purcell 
1992; Procter et al 1993.); 
6. they allow closer financial control (Kessler and Purcell 1992; Procter et al 1993; 
Pendleton 1992); 
7. as organisations become flatter, it becomes more difficult to reward through 
promotion.  PRP enables selective rewarding, combined with development 
programmes such as performance management systems, to dilute employee 
dissatisfaction (Goodhart 1993). 
 
 We can therefore begin the search for ways of explaining such behaviour in 
analytical terms.  Kessler (1994) found that organisations are very much bound by their 
own histories and many of the factors discussed above show pay as a continuous process 
linked to the various environments in which the organisation and its employees operate.  
To a great extent, this means the situation in which the organisation might find itself is 
embedded in the social, political and economic situation in which it operates.  For example, 
one prediction may be that that the outcomes of any PRP scheme may be very different in 
varying organisations even if the schemes appear largely similar on paper. 
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 Contingency theory posits an appropriate functional fit between environmental 
settings and internal organisational structures. By the mid-1970s it was the dominant 
approach applied to specifics such as payment systems (e.g., Lupton and Gowler 1969).  
Despite proving overly deterministic the contingency approach was somewhat revived with 
the onset of HRM, with a variety of strategic HRM models being contingency models. The 
US literature on PRP favours very much the contingency approach (Balkin & Bannister, 
1993; Bannister & Balkin, 1990).  
 
 One does not, however, have to view contingency theory as a set of measuring 
instruments and precise predictions about specific structural features for a particular task, 
its size and environmental attributes but, rather, useful as a conceptual and analytical 
framework (Francis 1994).  The implications being that the form PRP takes may depend 
on the environment and the relevant actors. 
 
 Because studies are drawn into examining a link between PRP and motivation there 
has been little attempt to put PRP within a theoretical perspective or to link it to the 
overall objectives of change and restructuring (Kessler 1994).  There is still a tendency to 
talk about PRP schemes in a generalised way and, despite the volume of descriptive 
literature on PRP, it still tends to be routinely referred to as a technique indicative of 
newer HRM approaches or illustrative of the shift from collectivism to individualism 
(Kessler 1994).  By starting with the concept that pay concerns control over the effort 
bargain and the problem of double contract (Baldamus, 1961; Lupton and Gowler, 1969), 
the continued popularity of PRP in the light of the growing evidence against it may begin 
to make some sense.  The employer has to use a set of both coercive and motivational 
policies in order to get employees to work as they would wish.  It has long been 
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recognised that coercion, resistance and consent can all interact in a dynamic way to 
produce indeterminate outcomes (Burawoy 1979; Edwards 1986; Thompson and McHugh 
1995).  With this in mind, rather than all these schemes being doomed to failure (Kohn 
1993), perhaps Thompson (1993) is correct in saying PRP is being measured against the 
wrong targets? 
 
Before moving on it will be worthwhile to highlight in which sense I am talking about 
control. In most of the literature in this area ‘control’ conjures up notions of exploitation 
and is either viewed as something highlighting a lack of power of the exploited group 
versus a denial of existence by the exploiting group. Yet control can be both positive and 
negative. On the positive side it is viewed as a necessary part of organisational life by 
providing a degree of order, predictability, discretion, responsibility and autonomy. On the 
negative side it involves coercion, domination, exploitation and manipulation. In reality it 
is likely to involve a combination of the two depending on the relative strengths of the 
various actors. H & B (199?) There can also be three main connotations to organisational 
control all of which in reality over lap with each other. First, ‘economic’ control in the 
sense if control breaks down there is a lack of organisation and resources get wasted. 
Control is thus seen as a means of securing efficiency by achieving the best use of 
resources. Second, is ‘psychological’ control. This is necessary to create stable and 
predictable conditions within which people can work effectively. Control is thus a means 
of establishing predictability as a psychological well being and work performance can be 
disrupted by uncertainty ambiguity and disorder. Third is ‘political’ control in which 
powerful individuals or groups dominate others. Decisions in the control process are more 
likely to be taken by managers who resist attempts to let others, particularly subordinates, 
interfere. Control is thus a means of perpetuating inequalities of power and other resources 
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in the organisation. Control is thus multi faceted and derives from pressures and 
requirements both external and internal to the organisation. 
 
The Politics of Pay 
 Thus far, it has been suggested that PRP may not provide the benefits purported 
under its traditional uses.  However, further investigation suggests that PRP may be better 
viewed as a control mechanism, whose nature is contingent on the organisation and its 
context.  This is not contingency in a deterministic fashion, rather, it reflects that 
organisations have a degree of choice within organisational boundaries.  This means that 
this paper recognises those factors already highlighted by others and combines them with a 
progressive view of control and contingency theory which recognise the political nature of 
pay.  It is the politics of pay to which we now turn in order to clarify the picture.  This can 
be highlighted through an examination of the ‘politics of pay’ which impact at the micro, 
meso and macro levels, though in practice they interact. 
 
 In essence, the political debate which has centred on and around PRP has pursued 
higher order aims than the motivating effects of cash or non-cash rewards (Smith 1993).  
The role of government in the determination of pay and performance norms is just as 
important as that between organisations and employees.  The Thatcher government came 
to power in 1979, determined to contain labour costs as part of their programme of 
economic improvement.  In this way, Smith (1993) argues that what they were attempting 
with regard to financial rewards was little different to that attempted by earlier Labour and 
Conservative governments of the post-war period.  The difference was that, rather than 
using incomes policies and agreements with the trade unions, Tory governments sought to 
address labour markets factors directly. 
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 Perceptions of performance vary at many levels.  For the UK governments of the 
1980s/90s, improving the performance of the economy was based on ‘atomistic’ 
competition via the introduction of market forces, deregulation and the individualisation of 
the employment relationship.  Yet for companies these concepts do not necessarily have 
the same meaning.  For example, competition may mean gaining greater control of the 
production process and the strengthening of market share.  The growth of the 
multinational corporation (MNC) is certainly one indication of this.  Also, the trend 
towards individualism was marked very much by ‘standardised packages individually 
wrapped’ (Evans and Hudson 1993).  Recent changes to pay reflect three main factors 
acting on any organisation: a change in management strategies in light of intensifying 
competition; the adoption of new production arrangements; and key changes in the 
organisational context (Arrowsmith & Sisson, 1998).  Thus highlighting a wide range of 
factors which potentially impact on pay decisions.  
 
 The implication are that the effects, of any pay scheme, on company performance 
are at best indeterminate.  This problem is compounded by the fact that most companies 
do not appear to make any efforts to directly measure the effects of PRP schemes on 
company performance despite Williamson’s (1975) insistence on considering the role of 
measurement and monitoring within the M Form organisation.  Even indirect measures 
such as monitoring and surveys are largely based on gauging employee opinion and 
consistent application of the scheme (Gilman 1996).  This is very interesting as the main 
raison d’être of these schemes is that they allegedly improve performance: 
“Reward management has been treated as something tangible, particularly by 
management consultants and Conservative governments, and has been touted as a 
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new input to management practice which can create improved economic 
performance and wealth and as an ingredient of the process of change to the 
enterprise culture across a variety of employing  organisations” (Smith 1993: 45). 
 
 As the quote highlights PRP is essentially supposed to be about improving the 
performance of the organisation, yet the complex nature of the employment relationship 
means that pay is often utilised to address more than this. 
 
 Linking pay to performance is not problematic in the world of orthodox economic 
theory because the level of pay of any worker is determined by the forces of supply and 
demand.  In the real world, however, we know that there are marked variations in 
efficiency and a range of indeterminacy in pay rates (Lester 1952), even for workers in the 
same occupations and districts (Brown et al. 1995).  As Brown & Walsh (1994) argue the 
nature of this problem is an age old one. The act of hiring an employee is not sufficient to 
ensure that the job gets.  The employer has to use a variety of means, including control, 
consent, etc., in order to get the employee to apply time and effort to completing the task.  
A rich tradition, used for analysing the nature of the employment relationship (Baldamus 
1961; Behrend 1957; Hyman and Brough 1975; Brown et al. 1995; Brown & Walsh, 
1994) proved successful in analysing other pay systems and will be utilised to analyse PRP. 
 
 For Baldamus (1961), the organisation of industry revolves around the 
administration process by which the employee’s effort is controlled by the employer.  The 
reason why this problem has received little attention is that it has been customary to 
describe matters in terms of efficiency.  Efficiency is usually preferred because effort is 
neither easily measured nor defined.  So the problem becomes one of definition, 
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concerning what interpretation and terminology are applied to the measurement of 
performance.  The trouble is that performance is usually used interchangeably with 
concepts such as productivity, profitability and efficiency.  Thus, there is a constant 
readjustment of attempts to define efficiency and hence effort and PRP may be seen by 
some as a conceptual way of aligning the two. 
 
 The use of incentive schemes rests on three assumptions (Behrend, 1957): that 
effort intensity can be varied, that the financial motive is the most important and that the 
only way of harnessing increased effort is by utilising incentive schemes.  Yet there are 
some essential problems to the measurement of effort (Baldamus 1961; Behrend 1957): 
· it is impossible to say whether two workers with the same work performance 
experience the same degree of effort. 
· equal effort does not necessarily represent equal marginal productivity, though in 
incentive schemes it is equal effort which is rewarded.  “A policy of paying a standard 
rate for equal effort and skill may thus conflict with a policy of rewarding according to 
marginal productivity” (Behrend 1957; 511). 
· notions of effort have never been merely about the amount of energy expended on the 
job, but have always included the kinds of behaviours that should be expressed in doing 
the job. 
 
 The points to make here are fourfold.  First, we are dealing with a notion of the 
effort bargain.  Second, there are problems with the effort bargain due to the subjective 
nature of effort and the fact that it is extremely difficult to specify in advance the levels of 
effort needed.  Third, this leads to problems of control and how to overcome such 
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problems.  This leads finally to the point that employers may have to rely heavily on 
employee consent for many practices (i.e. the negotiation of consent). 
 
 The process is further confused by the fact that, in terms of pay, there are at least 
two separate mechanisms at work in deciding what compensation should be allocated to 
each person.  One is the occupational element, the other the employment element.  The 
former refers to the skills and experience utilised in carrying out work while the latter 
refers to the amount of effort involved in doing the work.  For Baldamus (1961), this is 
problematic because it is impossible to separate the two elements. 
 
 The role of social norms also has a large role to play here.  The force of tradition is 
quite powerful, and when combined with an appeal to custom and practice the principle is 
strong enough to produce a moral content that is recognised by workers and employers 
alike, even to the point where it constitutes, in effect, a countervailing source of legitimacy 
to that of managerial authority.  Hyman and Brough (1975) argue that there is much 
evidence that the definition of work obligation in the everyday employment situation can 
usually be understood as an example of negotiated order.  Thus, what is at issue is the 
ideology and social imagery held by employees and employers, generated not only within 
work but in social life generally.  This is the case for both employers and employees.  Both 
usually hold strong views on the maximum as well as a minimum level of work effort to 
apply.  The level of negotiated order depends on the power of the various actors.  Once a 
compromise has been reached, Hyman and Brough (1975: 72) quote Flanders: 
 
One has not to take an over optimistic view of human nature to recognise that 
when job performance is governed by a set of agreed rules and when the rewards 
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attached to performance are thought to be justly determined there is a much greater 
prospect of workers feeling a sense of obligation to give a fair day’s work .... 
 
In terms of the power relations involved here, while employers have power to some extent, 
the power of work groups is essentially defensive and reactive.  With PRP we may be 
witnessing attempts by employers to negotiate new standards of effort and social norms. 
The three factors leading to changing pay systems mentioned by Arrowsmith and Sisson 
(1998) also create changing norms and go some way to explaining the demand for new pay 
systems, not just from employers but also from employees themselves. Employers look for 
new ways of reward and administration in light of restructuring while employees look for 
the same in the light of being restructured. The problem lies in each parties interpretation 
of what the outcome should be. It is to these contradictions that we shall now turn. 
 
The Case Studies 
 The above highlight the complexity of the pay/performance relationship suggesting 
that PRP might be more appropriately analysed taking account of the ‘politics of pay’ and 
the contingency, consent and control involved. The paper focuses on ethnographic case 
studies in four of 16 organisations - Bank Co., Retail Co., Engineering Co. and Public 
Agency - to highlight these factors.  After long histories of paternalistic employment 
practices all were undergoing immense restructuring and technological change of both the 
organisation and the jobs within it.  Bank Co. is one of the UK’s largest and most 
successful banks employing over 89,000 people around the world.  Retail Co. is one of the 
UK’s major high street chains employing 81,000 people world-wide.  Engineering Co. is 
part of a separate division of Retail Co. engaged in the manufacturing side.  Engineering 
Co. only employ 500 in the UK but is staffed solely by skilled craftspeople.  Agency Co. 
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was originally part of the civil service but were given agency status under the ‘next steps’ 
programme.  The agency employs 36,000 people across the UK.  Three of the case studies 
were companies with the same schemes on paper, with the fourth (Eng. Co.) moving 
towards this type of scheme.  This was a performance management scheme in which every 
individual is given a performance contract specifying their objectives for the year.  These 
objectives are supposed to reflect a combination of the overall company objectives and 
those utilised for each individuals job. 
 
The contingencies of PRP 
 Two distinct factors stood out concerning the variability of PRP schemes.  First, 
despite similar pressures and similar pay schemes on paper there were variable outcomes.  
In line with the predictions of contingency theory, certain distinctive factors were 
portrayed by organisations which utilised PRP.  Each of the four companies appeared to 
have similar pressures acting upon them including: changing technology and work 
organisation/structures; changing organisational structures; highly competitive 
environment with rapid product changes; a weakened position of labour, often 
accompanied by redundancies.  Although it should be noted that some groups of workers 
did feel that they were gaining more bargaining power via the changes.  Organisations, 
however, had a degree of choice over the way in which they implemented policies.  This 
was indicated by the fact that despite a trend towards similar types of scheme, the 
application of the schemes displayed many differences.  There was a diversity of 
performance criteria, methods of scoring individuals, and means of linking pay to 
performance (Gilman, 1998).  Thus, the different labels disguised similar schemes while the 
similarity in the concept of payment systems disguised many differences based on 
organisation specific factors. 
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 Second, all shared a constant ‘tinkering’ with their PRP schemes in order to 
correct deficiencies.  The Engineering Co. scheme was one of the older type of PRP 
schemes which concentrated on behaviours and traits which the company thought were 
specific to the roles within the organisation.  This type of scheme had already been 
experienced by the other three organisations prior to the implementation of new PRP 
schemes.  The other three were all Performance Management schemes which on paper 
appeared remarkably similar.  Yet there were clear differences in practice.  These were 
mainly due to companies prioritising and dealing with the various pressures facing them in 
their own way as will be highlighted below. 
 
Engineering Co., was undergoing immense change with responsibility for employees 
slowly being split up between new divisional structures in the parent company.  Along with 
this, changing production techniques meant that there was great pressure to cross 
traditional demarcation lines.  Despite being part of a group, management arrived at the 
decision to implement a PRP scheme separate from any pressures from central personnel  
They were largely concerned with gaining the flexibility and multi-skilling not possible 
within the existing job evaluation scheme, along with control of labour costs.  The scheme 
took three years to negotiate and from the start the scheme was already experiencing 
difficulties and likely to be short lived.  First, because it only allowed a transitional shift in 
terms of breaking down demarcation lines and second, it faced immediate pressure from 
the centre to standardise towards the type of scheme used in the rest of the company.  In 
fact, as the research was concluding, management was already in the process of attempting 
to negotiate a performance management scheme which was equivalent to that in the rest of 
the organisation (i.e. Retail Co.). 
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 Retail Co. is the parent company of the above and was experiencing the selling and 
buying of different companies and the re-organisation of its divisionalised structure.  
Combined with this were: pressures in the retail markets had led to a restructuring of work 
organisation especially in the shops where there was now a clear distinction emerging 
between ‘back end’ and ‘front end’ staff; and rapid technological change, especially with 
the introduction of computerised systems.  Managers welcomed the introduction of PRP 
but were uncertain as to the accuracy of the objective setting process.  They felt that the 
scheme put them under pressure rather then providing them with help and guidance.  
Shopfloor workers thought that objectives were too standardised.  They often resented the 
fact that they were being told exactly how to sell, in addition to being closely supervised 
and monitored by mystery shoppers. 
 
 Managers and employees in Public Agency had similar problems to those in Retail 
Co.  They too faced restructuring and technological change but were probably the most 
frustrated by the whole process as they did not have full control over their own destiny.  
They faced twin pressures from government who constantly changed their policy towards 
how the Agency should carry out its work and from the Treasury who were in overall 
financial control despite the Agency being portrayed as an autonomous organisation.  This 
meant that the Agency was always working within parameters that had been pre-specified 
by government.   
 
 Staff at Bank Co. were also undergoing changing organisational and work 
structures and although competition was growing rapidly it is probably true to say that the 
greatest pressures for change came from rapidly changing technology which was 
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completely transforming the roles of staff within the bank.  Like Retail Co. there was a 
particular move towards ‘back end’ and ‘front end’ staff and a specialisation of various 
roles.  Managers at Bank Co. had been used to PRP for a long time.  What they were not 
used to was the fact that their performance was now so closely tied to their pay.  
Managers at Bank Co. were not strangers to having their performance scrutinised but in 
the past this was mainly for the purpose of promotion.  Thus, they not only felt that 
control had been taken away from them but also that their roles were moving, due to 
changing job structures, away from what they considered they should be. 
 
Contradiction in the search for control? 
 Many of the contradictions highlighted above were due to schemes having more of 
an emphasis on aiding a change in the way that the organisation was administered and in 
altering the equilibrium level of effort in the following ways: 
· controlling labour costs and their distribution; 
· mass individualism – individual, but standardised contracts; and 
· flexible standardisation - the combined search for flexibility and standardisation 
simultaneously. 
 
Labour costs and distribution 
 It is almost built into our value of the work/pay relationship that we should have a 
fair link between what we do and what we receive in return.  In fact, employees may 
believe in equity of pay structures because it represents lasting differences in the status of 
labour (Baldamus 1961).  The problem with all four schemes was that there was very little 
evidence of a genuine link between an individual’s performance and their reward.  
Secondly, the objective of new pay structures may not just be to improve performance per 
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se.  For example, most of the organisations sought to control the distribution of 
performance, and hence, pay, through their schemes.  A typical distribution may be that 
10% do not exceed their contract (i.e. fail), 90% meet their contract (i.e. are average) and 
10% exceed their contract. 
 
 What this means is that organisations are arranging all workers so as to share out a 
pre-determined ‘pot’ of money.  While this may be acceptable and fair within the limits of 
a pay budget, confusion stems from the fact that organisations go on to portray the scheme 
as purely performance based and employees expect it to be so.  It does not take long 
before staff realise this is not the case, with the consequence that the scheme loses 
credibility.  A further problem is that within this distribution, rewards are aimed at giving 
more to the above average performance and nothing to the below average performance 
within the limits of the pay ‘pot’.  Therefore, only a certain number of people can ever 
better their pay above the average, whatever their performance.  This means that the 
determination of performance comes more under the control of the organisation which 
then attempts to base it on setting new norms.  The new norms in the case of PRP, 
however, are set on the basis of the best and not the average performer.  This is 
highlighted by the fact that employees are put under constant pressure to accept higher 
targets: 
at first I was really motivated, but then in reality.....PCA (portfolio contribution 
analysis) which is the income side of things, we get peer pressure on what to 
achieve, you know, so and so has agreed to this why can’t you (Bank Co.). 
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However, once objectives were exceeded, the new figures tended to be incorporated into 
next year’s targets, thus making the ‘average’ employee more like Taylor’s first class 
worker (Newton and Findley 1996).  For example, Mangers commented: 
“We set the goals and they say that the targets are achievable, but when you 
achieve the goal the posts move again” (Retail Co.). 
“It’s to get more work out of you.  You are made to feel that you have never done 
enough” (Agency Co.) 
To add to the confusion, the total pay ‘pot’ can be manipulated by the organisation so that 
if decreased, performance then becomes based on ever smaller amounts.  Even the average 
worker may get less than he or she would have expected under previous schemes and 
these new pay schemes and structures may have allowed the redistribution of income to 
particular groups, mainly managers and the higher paid (Rubery 1997). 
 
Mass Individualism 
 Crouch (1993) argues that as part of the return to the doctrine of orthodox 
economic theory, there is a new kind of mass individualism based on an ‘exit’ type of 
market.  It is the mass individualism and not so much the exit type of market which is 
significant here in that the ‘mass’ signifies that everyone is the same, while ‘individualism’ 
means that everyone is to be treated differently.  Thus, the inherent contradiction is 
summed up in a single concept. 
 
 Brown and Hudson (1997) argue that, a change in pay system is a central aspect of 
introducing the individualisation process.  The assumption of individualism in pay is that if 
effort can be brought down to the individual level, it is easier to measure and enables the 
payment of appropriate subsequent levels of reward.  This, for some, leads to the 
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assumption that the collective means of representation is seen as inappropriate.  The fact 
of the matter, however, is that collective rules and regulations are still highly appropriate 
and it may well be the case that there are transaction costs benefits for organisations in 
offering uniformity (Brown and Hudson 1997).  This as to be weighed against the benefits 
of flexibility involved with PRP which may off-set the transactions and other costs of 
moving away from bureaucratic structures (Rubery 1997).  So organisations might want to 
individualise pay while retaining the collective element of rules.  For as Brown and Hudson 
(1997) themselves argue, managing pay on an individual basis is certainly no simpler than 
managing it through collective bargaining. 
 
 Organisations have developed internal labour markets, seeing them as a means of 
containing opportunism and contributing to efficiency (Edwards 1990).  Many of the 
organisations were struggling with the distorting effects of attempting to simultaneously 
individualise and develop their internal structures.  One of the problems is that the focus on 
the individual as the unit of work through PRP means that the collective and social 
elements of the work are left hidden (Townley 1989). 
 
 One of the ways that ‘mass individualism’ can be highlighted in PRP is through the 
objective setting process whereby individualised objectives become standardised in order 
to provide objectivity.  Objective setting is seen as a mechanism for linking corporate plans 
to the daily work process of each person.  It can also be seen as an ‘exposure strategy’, 
exposing employees to financial and organisational information about the company’s 
competitive situation in a bid to win employees over to the goals of the organisation 
(Smith 1991).  Combined with this, records of how employees meet these objectives then 
make up the main source of information for effort stability control.  For example, not all 
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managers know how employees do their jobs or how much effort they put in.  The 
appraisal or objective setting process can aid them in establishing what jobs entail in 
greater detail.  In retail Co., for example, staff have monthly ‘blue cards’ in which they 
have to list what they had done and then show it to supervisors for them to approve that 
this was so.  A supervisor commented: 
“The scheme allows us to sort out the wheat from the chaff, put round pegs in 
round holes.  It shows everything up and gets you close to what staff do” (Retail 
Co.) 
 
 This can only be true, however, if the firm does not constantly undergo major 
changes.  Yet most organisations and employees are experiencing many changes.  For 
example, objectives at Bank Co. were seen to be inaccurate and often unachievable from 
the start of the contract.  This led to a lack of co-operation between various new sectors 
within the bank as they sought to hit their individual targets.  Objectives were made even 
more inappropriate by the fact that staff shortages meant that employees often had to 
cover for different jobs within these sectors.  A similar effect was also present within 
Public Agency, though not so severe.  In Public Agency, it was more the case that 
objectives were in opposition to what staff thought the job entailed.  Staff thought that 
spending time with the clients was an essential part of getting them back to work, and also 
for identifying who the ‘genuine fraudsters’ were.  Objectives, on the other hand, were 
reducing the time they were allowed to spend with each client while increasing the 
numbers expected to be taken off the unemployment figures.  Staff in all the organisations 
were also upset by the fact that the objective setting process talked the language of 
empowerment, yet in reality, the opposite was happening.  In Retail Co., objectives 
attempted to reinforce behaviours which employees thought inappropriate for their jobs.  
 24
While on the one hand the company were promoting the scheme as a two-way relationship 
in which workers set their own objectives, on the other, they were giving them objectives 
they did not agree with.  This not only attempted to control their behaviour but also the 
exactly what and how they should communicate with customers. 
 
 The severity of the processes involved is partly dependent on the severity of the 
pressure which management may be under.  Where there is little pressure the objectives 
remain relative.  For example, at Public Agency the pressure to hit the government targets 
was great but it was spread throughout the organisation and largely seen as stemming from 
government rather than from management.  However, in Retail Co. the emphasis was less 
on figures in the objectives than on direct controls and monthly objectives which already 
existed.  The objectives were more to do with reinforcing the behaviours which were to be 
utilised in meeting objectives.   
 
Standardised flexibility 
 Combined with the individualisation process a need to simultaneously internalise, 
standardise and provide flexibility was also noted in all the case studies.  In the case study 
companies there was a great deal of standardisation of jobs.  On the surface, employers 
were no longer looking for skills in terms of broad range, but rather, those utilised 
individually on the job (Regini 1995).  In reality, employees were utilising a broad range of 
skills in covering for other jobs, but were only being paid for those in their performance 
contract.  Thus, the development side of the contract acted as a means of absorbing 
knowledge from employees as they discussed what their job entailed each year, while the 




 Mostly this standardisation was brought on by the application of new technology 
and new product ranges, but also by organisational decision-making.  The fact that more 
complicated computerised measurement systems existed meant that organisations also 
thought that performance management systems were highly appropriate for the purposes 
of standardisation.  The problem was that the concentration on ‘paper efficiency’ gave 
organisations the illusion that what they were measuring and monitoring was accurate.  
Yet while they were highly efficient at recording facts and figures, what they could not do 
is identify how tasks were performed.  This was left to appraisers through the performance 
review and objective setting processes.  Although in reality this was not always done 
accurately or effectively. 
 
 There was a greater division of labour and standardisation in all but Engineering 
Co.  Here, the emphasis was more on being able to cross demarcation lines rather than 
narrowing them.  Hawkins (1978) argues that traditional craft norms of custom and 
practice make it very difficult for organisations to change their norms.  Yet in Engineering 
Co., job specificity was internalising employee norms, by making them specific to the 
organisation rather than the tradesperson or skill, while PRP enabled the organisation to 
change roles, cross demarcation lines and make them more specific to the organisation.  It 
could be claimed that this job specificity was a form of standardisation in itself.   
 
 This led to changing norms, in that all the case study organisations comprised jobs 
that were becoming very much job specific to these organisations.  This is much more 
complicated, however, than the process of deskilling portrayed by Braverman (1974).  
While jobs were being standardised, it is not automatically apparent which were being 
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deskilled or upskilled.  In Engineering Co., job content seemed to be enlarged at first sight 
in terms of the amounts of skills used (i.e. multi-craftsmen).  Yet because the jobs were 
becoming more standardised around particular roles or products they gave the impression 
of being more easily measured.  In many cases the jobs and the work organisation were in 
a transitional phase.  This meant that employees were having to become more flexible in 
covering more than one type of role.  The problem was intensified by the fact that the 
organisations were downsizing, usually before the transition was complete. 
 
 Part of the problem is due to the way in which performance contracts are set.  In 
Bank Co. and Retail Co. the performance contracts for individuals were completely 
standardised, other than the addition of numerical details.  There is however a difference 
between those which are standardised because management could not be bothered to 
differentiate them and those which are standard because head office have provided 
standard templates of what they should look like.  Public agency Co. was an example of 
the former while Bank Co. and Retail Co. were examples of the latter. 
 
 The companies attempted to provide standard contract templates in an effort to 
stem the amount of subjectivity surrounding objectives, which then meant that that the 
objectives did not reflect the whole of an individual’s job.  These also allowed management 
to ignore the process of setting objectives relevant to the individual, which organisations 
were so keen for them not to do.  The fact that organisations like Bank Co. are staffed by 
managers who were already very self-motivated because of the status that the positions 
they held meant that, for most, the money side was secondary.  Yet the fact that they were 
treated as if they did not understand their jobs caused much resentment.  Managers 
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struggled with their contracts because they were standardised and did not cover essential 
parts of the job. 
“It used to be well defined but with all the change it as become so woolly.  We 
have merged and jobs have changed but I still have the same contract”. 
“It is human nature that if you have got a contract driving you, you tend to drive 
your work to achieve that contract”. 
 
Consent for PRP schemes? 
 Given the potential negativities highlighted above and in other studies there needs 
to be a possible explanation for the apparent lack of explicit conflict around PRP?  The 
main reason is because in all four companies employees consented to the use of the 
schemes in various ways.  First, employees saw the appraisal process as an opportunity to 
‘voice’ their opinion, especially for those who felt they had little collective bargaining 
power but retained an amount of personal bargaining power.  This was so even where the 
appraisal process was less of a positive experience due to the prevailing culture of 
paternalism (e.g. Retail Co.).   
 
 Secondly, and related, some employees felt that they could use the scheme to their 
own advantage, including finding various ways of manipulating targets or results.  For 
example, in Engineering Co. employees saw it in terms of getting extra pay for additional 
tasks some of which they were already doing.  In Retail Co. those with potential good 




 Thirdly, employees initially considered the schemes to be better or more efficient 
than previous schemes which in most cases were reaching the end of their cycle.  In Public 
Agency, employees did not mind that the organisation was searching for more efficient 
ways of providing the service.  Many of them found the old ways of doing things to be 
overly bureaucratic and thus welcomed a certain amount of change.  In their opinion, the 
problem was that the kinds of processes and objectives being imposed on employees were 
more the product of cost-cutting exercises than of an efficiency exercise.  Management still 
had certain sympathies with other employees in that they felt more aligned with employees 
than being the ‘agents of capital’.  Both were bearing the brunt of the many changes which 
the organisation was undertaking.  Thus, to an extent, both management and employees 
were willing to conspire in the ‘fudging’ of figures.  PRP in Bank Co. appeared to have 
many more positive effects than the rest of the schemes in that it gave managers a wide 
degree of autonomy over the possible awards for good performance.  Managers, however, 
did not welcome the unconsolidated nature of PRP.  Also autonomy was within tight 
financial constraints and combined with increasing standardisation of objectives managers 
felt devalued. 
 
 Fourthly, employees thought positively about an overriding emphasis on 
developmental factors among the schemes although managers and employees mentioned 
that this was rarely carried out in practice.  Also managers in all of the companies 
considered themselves conscientious and very self-motivated and valued the autonomy 
PRP gave them despite the financial constraints.  In Retail Co., managers welcomed the 
performance management process as a good idea but had doubts about how it worked in 
practice.  Employees were driven more by peer pressure than objectives, as were managers 
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in Bank Co.  This was because carrying out the job competently gave them an element of 
‘status’ in the eyes of others. 
 
Finally, All employees tended to view themselves as good performers and therefore 
expected to be able to get an increase in pay through these schemes.  In most cases, for 
reason discussed in more detail below, they were to be highly disappointed. 
 
Discussion and Conclusions: Bargaining, uncertainty and power relations 
 The politics of pay highlights that, to change effort levels, motivation or attitudes 
of fairness, one has to change concepts of social norms, implying that there is an econ-
socio-political element involved.  This means that organisations may have to stay, to some 
extent, within the boundaries of their historical legacies as was highlighted by Kessler 
(1994). 
 
 Yet while social norms can create some kind of social order, they can also stand in 
the way of change so that while certain systems, as in free collective bargaining, may have 
been the norm for many years, it became less acceptable in the 1970s.  Due to the 
escalating costs and complexity of capital equipment and the growing size of production 
units, management have moved towards rationalisation and planning.  However, for 
planning to be effective, it requires predictability and control.  Labour costs and utilisation, 
the aspects of companies’ economic environment over which they have the greatest direct 
influence, represent one of the primary targets for rationalisation and control.  
 
 The changes in the case study organisations, which were primarily driven by 
competition, technology and product market changes, meant that new relationships were 
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being sought by the organisations, ones in which predictability and control were all 
important.  For example, each of the companies had changed their job structures and 
methods of measurement relying on, in all but Engineering Co., computer systems for the 
measurement of performance indicators.  Giving the illusion that performance could thus 
be measured.  Additionally it gave management the illusion that new effort standards could 
be set and monitored.  In this sense PRP must have seemed an ideal way of balancing all 
these forces and dealing with change. 
 
 It has long been argued that control is shifting and contested, with swings between 
worker autonomy and direct managerial control.  Both employers and employees can use 
social constructions to legitimise certain levels of wages.  From the 1980s, one saw an 
increased ability to engage in behaviour of this kind on the part of employers.  The point to 
be made is that norms are not fixed and hence pay standards can be changed.  PRP may be 
one way of doing this.  It was noted above that organisations have to apply different 
methods of administrative control in order to extract employee effort (Baldamus, 1961).  
This means that there has to be both an ‘effort bargain’ and a ‘process bargain’ to establish 
the basis and administrative rules of the new relationship. 
 
Effort Bargain 
 Every employment contract involves a bargain to decide how much effort is 
required and how much is utilised.  It has been customary for the basis of this bargain to 
revolve around three factors: Custom and practice, formal standards, and the conflictual 
tension between the two (Littler, 1982).  Systems like scientific management were aimed 
at making the notion of the effort/wage bargain more transparent and changing the basis of 
custom and practice in favour of the organisation.  For this to be the case there has to be a 
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normative basis to levels of effort built into skills and occupations.  So there must be some 
relationship between effort and control in the minds of those involved in the bargain..  The 
objective of the various parties involved is to guess as consistently as possible the purely 
subjective element of effort standards, and subsequently to adjust rates of pay in 
accordance with them (Baldamus, 1961; Littler, 1982).  Baldamus may have had 
piecework in mind , but PRP may turn this on its head in that it keeps pay rates relatively 
consistent, while giving employees the impression that they can adjust their effort to get 
more.  Therefore, one could argue that PRP has resolved the problem not by being 
scientific but by admitting that it is not scientific and leaving management discretion and 
power to deal with the contradictions.  Technical tools such as computer systems are 
thought to make consistent the guesswork on effort intensities and make it easier to 
establish these customary norms.  But as Edwards (1991) argues custom only becomes 
practice when it ceases to be an understanding and becomes a right to be insisted upon.  
Thus a bargain must take place to establish custom. 
 
 One of the main problems is that if there is a further division of labour and if job 
roles are fractured, then there are no longer any customary standards.  Yet it is equally 
true that if jobs are changed purposely then it may allow a redefinition of effort levels to 
suit.  So there may be a dual purpose in which some effort norms have changed due to 
restructuring, but some restructuring may also be specifically aimed at changing effort 
norms.  This led Baldamus to describe the bargain as involving: effort stability controls 
(criteria of employee performance in order to guess the effort needed) and effort intensity 




 If we combine this with the increasing use of technology and job standardisation, 
this means that the control of effort via the use of incentive schemes such as PRP also then 
requires other specific devices for administrating such schemes (e.g. HRM).  Littler (1982) 
implies that the process is all about identifying effort levels and then trying to formalise 
these into standards.  Different management techniques all have in common the fact that 
they were utilised in order to aid the stabilisation of the average level of individual effort 
over time.  It is this stability function of effort control which appears as a separate 
mechanism from any market mechanisms which may be at play (Baldamus 1961).  And 
which is usually more commonly recognised as the system of administration. 
 
For some organisations piecework was an example of an attempt to reinforce effort levels 
under a previous system of employment regulation.  The problems with that system was 
that employees found ways of restricting output (Brown 1973).  Output restriction was 
based on fears of rate cutting and these fears were fed by past experience of rate cutting.  
So in an arena of mistrust, management were faced with the problem of lack of 
observability.  The same is apparent with PRP over objective setting.  This highlights the 
fact that effort controls are heterogeneous and cannot be confined to particular modes of 
control. 
 
 A final element in the process bargain is that employers have to respond to changes 
in perceived risk attached to traditional internal labour market structures, even if these 
responses involve them in increased costs (Rubery, 1997).  The attraction of PRP in 
offering the illusion of empowerment must be extremely attractive in these situations.  
Also, the rhetoric of delegation and decentralisation may help to disguise enhanced 
surveillance and concentrate power at the centre.(Newton & Findlay, 1996). 
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 The above discussion highlights the extreme complexity of the employment 
relationship.  This paper argues that more value can be gained by highlighting the 
processes by which this complex interaction works and its outcomes.  The whole process 
is better viewed as a bargain within the environmental context (i.e. the social, political and 
economic pressures).  It is the re-negotiation of control and effort.  On the one hand, the 
employer wants the flexibility of labour inputs to gain competitive advantage.  On the 
other hand, there are what the employer sees as social, political and economic obstacles 
acting as barriers to this.  Using the framework allows one to delve deeper into the 
rationales underlying the use of PRP schemes identifying their organisation and effect. 
 
 It introduces the possibility that the motivation for changing pay structures may not 
just be the result of changing organisational requirements or needs, but may also be to do 
with changing power relations between capital and labour and among worker groups more 
generally.  It is precisely the political and labour market changes in the UK and changes to 
the wider external environment that not only stimulated organisations to make changes, 
but also gives them the opportunity to do so.  The fact that changes in the external 
environment stimulates and gives organisations the opportunity to change does not explain 
why PRP does not give a precise link between pay and performance.  That PRP is used to 
address many differing factors might do so, however.  The research found that changes in 
the companies studied were complicated by a simultaneous search for control, compliance 
and consent to aid the management of uncertainty.  Further the outcomes and the schemes 
were largely specific to each organisation, depending on the negotiation of the ‘politics of 
pay’.  Taking into account the ‘politics of pay’ and the search for control and consent 
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allows one to delve much deeper into the rationale and contradictions of PRP than does a 
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